

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

LYNN FAULKNER,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Case No.: 09-07055-GBD-SN
)	
USAMA BIN LADEN, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
_____)	

Country expert report in respect of:

The Taliban Emirate 1996-2001

Date of report:

31 July 2020

This report has been prepared by:

Dr Antonio Giustozzi

1. I have been asked by Plaintiff's counsel to prepare a report on the Taliban's Emirate and its capabilities as a state.

2. I am aware that in providing this report, my overriding duty is to the court. I believe that the facts stated in this report are true, and that the opinions I have expressed are correct. I believe that I have dealt fully with those issues which have been drawn to my attention or which seem relevant to my understanding of this case. I have not omitted any facts of which I am aware which would have had a material effect on my conclusions as stated above. The absence of an expressed opinion on any particular point should not be construed as meaning that I have no opinion on that point. I would be happy to assist the court by clarifying any matter raised herein. My fee is not dependent on the outcome of this appeal. My compensation from Plaintiff's counsel for preparing this report is \$1,000 and \$1,000 for any time giving deposition testimony.

General outline of the Taliban Emirate

3. The Taliban movement had its center in Kandahar, where its leadership council (the Supreme Council) was based, while the Taliban state had its center in Kabul (where the Council of Ministers was based, led by the Chairman of the Council of Minister). As Ibrahimi describes it,

The Supreme Council had six members and directly led by Mullah Omer, and the Council of Ministers worked under the direct supervision of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council had two subsidiary branches, an Ulema Shura or the Council of Clerics and a Military Council that consulted, respectively, the country's religious and military affairs and worked directly under Mullah Omer's command.¹

The Supreme Council would give the Council of Ministers the guidelines for action and reserved the right of interfering in state decision-making as it saw fit.

4. The role of the Supreme Council was planned to gradually reduce over time, and in May 2001 the Council of the Ministers' Act was published, making the ministries in Kabul the 'leading executive and administrative organizations of the Taliban Emirate, including its army and security force.² It is not clear how far the implementation of the act went before the collapse of the Emirate.

5. The Taliban Emirate had limited sources of revenue and a very tight budget. Mostly it raised taxes on transit trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, estimated to amount to \$100-130 million per year.³ Foreign aid from Pakistan has been estimated at an additional

¹ S. Yaqub Ibrahimi (2017) The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

² S. Yaqub Ibrahimi (2017) The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

³ S. Yaqub Ibrahimi (2017) The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

\$5 million, plus logistical support.⁴ Bin Laden reportedly paid \$10-20 million into the Emirate's coffers.⁵ Former Taliban official Mullah Zaeef, however, estimated the total revenue of the Emirate even lower, as \$80 million in total.⁶

6. Most of the budget was spent on fighting the on-going conflict, and development expenditure was a mere \$7 million/year.⁷ Mostly the money was spent on small development and service providing projects such rebuilding a few public libraries and madrasas, responding to emergency needs and reconstruction of some urban streets and provincial governmental establishments.⁸

7. Basic services were mostly provided by externally funded NGOs: food distribution, health care, some education.⁹

8. The top layers of government (ministers, deputy ministers, provincial governors) were all mullahs, who also doubled up as military commanders and constantly rotated in and out of the ministerial jobs to take part in the fighting. This seems to have been meant to maintain the purity of the movement and the connection between the fighters and the leaders.¹⁰

9. The Taliban stated that they operated on the basis of the 1964 constitution, promulgated by King Zahir Shah, although with some unspecified changes.¹¹

⁴ S. Yaqub Ibrahim (2017) *The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy*, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

⁵ S. Yaqub Ibrahim (2017) *The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy*, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

⁶ Abdula Salam Zaeef, *My life with the Taliban*, London : Hurst, 2011, 97.

⁷ Zaeef, 97.

⁸ S. Yaqub Ibrahim (2017) *The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy*, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

⁹ S. Yaqub Ibrahim (2017) *The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy*, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

¹⁰ S. Yaqub Ibrahim (2017) *The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): 'War-Making and State-Making' as an Insurgency Strategy*, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:6, 947-972.

¹¹ Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise Of The Taliban In Afghanistan*, Palgrave, 2002.


10. Although the Taliban did not have a formal state budget, the individual ministries had their own budgets, based on a mix of arrangements with the Central Bank and with the Supreme Council, which had cash reserves to be distributed around the different offices.¹²

11. While the bulk of their resources were dedicated to the military effort, the Taliban did carry out a few improvements or repairs to the badly shaken infrastructure of the country. In 1999, following complaints about the isolation of the country by relatives of the many Afghans residing abroad, they decided to re-establish a postal service, which had collapsed in 1992, and to establish a provisional telephone service with Pakistani numbers. They also started negotiations about the establishment of a mobile telephone service and showed keen interest in a gas pipeline project linking Turkmenistan to Pakistan.

12. Many intellectuals, mostly Pashtun nationalists, saw in the Taliban the only possibility of preserving the integrity of the Afghan state and therefore supported them, albeit critically. The Taliban's segregationist policies towards women were highly displeasing to secular Afghans and were amongst the main bones of contention between specialists, administrative staff and intellectuals on one side and the Taliban or the other. Moreover, the Taliban themselves were divided between moderate and radical elements, with the latter being dominant. Moderates like Mullah Rabbani were nevertheless able to argue for the inclusion of as many educated people as possible in the administration in order to improve its effectiveness; but at no stage were members of the intelligentsia able to emerge from their roles of technical staff or advisers and play a political role within the Taliban regime.¹³

¹² Zaeef, 85.

¹³ Interviews with members of the intelligentsia and former Taliban officials 2005-6.

Map 1: areas controlled by the Taliban Emirate, 2000 (in white).

Territory controlled by Masud, March 2000.

Source: G. Dorronsoro, *Afghanistan: Revolution unending*, London ; Hurst, 2005.

Diplomacy

13. Taliban officials were soon looking for some international legitimacy and offered to ban the opium poppy harvest in exchange for international aid and possibly diplomatic recognition. They even implemented bans on the cultivation of the poppies, beginning with a partial one in 1999 and then expanding this to a complete one in 2000.¹⁴

14. At the end of 1998, once the Taliban had control of 90% of Afghanistan, they made their first bid to achieve international recognition. Only Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia recognised them, but a number of other governments flirted with this possibility, including the US (see below). The Taliban government appointed unofficial representatives to major countries in the region and in the world, as well as to the UN. The Taliban also sent

¹⁴ Alain Labrousse, *Afghanistan, opium de guerre, opium de paix*, Fayard, 2005.

numerous delegations to Asia and Europe, to lobby for recognition or for investment.¹⁵ In particular the Taliban administration sent delegates to at least China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Central Asia.¹⁶ Although the Turkmen government did not formally recognise the Taliban Emirate, the Taliban were allowed to keep a representative in Ashgabat and was reaching trade agreements with the Emirate.¹⁷ The Kazakh government also had relations with the Taliban and met Taliban delegation in Almata.¹⁸

15. When the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, the US government even announced its intention of re-establishing diplomatic relations with them, but the policy was changed after 2 months and a more cautious approach was adopted. Still the US authorities were hoping that the Taliban could bring stability back to Afghanistan and cooperate on counter-narcotics. Then US internal political debates made the Taliban an impossible diplomatic partner.¹⁹

16. In the US the Taliban Emirate was represented by Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who headed up the Taliban's U.N. diplomatic outpost in New York. Hakim frequently met US diplomats such as Bill Richardson and Karl "Rick" Inderfurth, then assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs. They mostly sought to discuss the fate of Osama bin Laden.²⁰ Another common topic of discussion with the Taliban was the narcotics trade.²¹ Other meetings were held in Pakistan. US diplomats reportedly also visited Kandahar.²²

¹⁵ Nojumi, 2002.

¹⁶ Nojumi, 2002.

¹⁷ Marlene Laruelle (ed.), *The Central Asia–Afghanistan Relationship*, Lexington Books, 2017.

¹⁸ Zaef, 96.

¹⁹ Conrad Schetter and Bernd Kuzmits, The revival of geopolitics, in Jurgen Ruland (ed.), *U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Third World: A Post-Cold War Assessment*, Routledge 2016.

²⁰ COLUM LYNCH, 'The Taliban's Broken Pledge to Contain Terrorists', *Foreign Policy*, AUGUST 30, 2019; S E C R E T STATE 031692, ALMATY FOR DUSHANBE, E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/18/09, SUBJECT: TALIBAN CLAIM BIN LADEN OUT OF THEIR TERRITORY, CLASSIFIED BY KARL F. INDERFURTH, A/S, SA. REASON: 1.5 (D).

²¹ C O N F I D E N T I A L KARACHI 001443, E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/07, SUBJECT: TALIBAN REP ON NARCOTICS AND BIN LADEN, 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DOUGLAS B. ARCHARD, CONSUL GENERAL, AMCONGEN KARACHI. REASON 1.5(D).

²² Jonathan Steele, *Ghosts of Afghanistan*, Catapult, 2011.

17. The Afghan embassy was paralysed by the conflict between in second secretary Seraj Jamal (pro-Taliban) and embassy head Yar Mohammed Mohabbat (pro-Rabbani), and the US government did not recognise either side.²³

18. In November 1997, the head of the Taliban government, Mullah Mohammed Rabbani, attempted to obtain full membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for the Taliban Emirate. Despite the support of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, the bid failed.²⁴

Governance

19. The Taliban reverted to the governance system of the early years of the monarchy (1880-1900) to run the country. The clerical-judicial core of the regime provided an institutional framework which contained abuses and de-personalised issues. The Taliban did not really have a real intelligence service, but they used sympathising clerical networks for information gathering, a system which proved to be quite effective. Thanks to them, the Taliban were comparatively well informed of what was going on in the villages and were able to single out opposition elements (real or presumed) and target them accurately. Although the leadership of the Taliban was overwhelmingly Pashtun, these clerical networks were the closest thing to a nationwide base than any Afghan government has ever had previously and since. The Taliban maintained some uniformed police force in the urban centres, but relied on small detachments of their own 'army' to control the provinces. Their system was sufficiently effective and their reputation sufficiently ruthless to discourage widespread opposition. Only in some remote mountain areas of northern and central Afghanistan pockets of resistance formed, but they never represented a serious threat to the regime. Rural security was as good as ever and banditry effectively rooted out.²⁵

20. Executive power was always paramount in implementing governance, with police until 1992 responding to the Ministry and being authorised to carry out investigation and arrests without any intervention of the judiciary. Only during the time of the Taliban in power that

²³ Nojumi, 2002.

²⁴ Nojumi, 2002.

²⁵ Interviews with local elders and expatriate NGO workers, 2006-2007.

changed, and the judiciary played a greater role. It appears that in 1996-2001 even in the provinces Shari'a judges were called in to supervise the actions of police and administration and were independent of the executive.²⁶

21. In 1992-1996 the old administrative structure mostly survived after some purging, but its importance was reduced by the emergence of alternative arrangements, such as provincial councils of military commanders, or by the personal power of individual strongmen, who relied on personal authority and usually bypassed established chains of command. Governance therefore returned to the fragmented and fully patrimonial condition of the pre-Abdur Rahman time. Under the Taliban from 1996 onwards, the state administration was cut to a minimum both in Kabul and in the provinces. District administrations in particular were reduced to the bare essential again, that is maintaining peace through mediation and negotiation, and staff levels fell correspondingly. Provincial governors were appointed from the centre once again, usually from outside the province and rotated periodically. While this administrative structure was basic, the Taliban were at least able to deliver on their promises. Helped by the Taliban's police, the administration was able to play an important role in maintaining stability and in many areas effectively succeeded in collecting weapons away from the population.²⁷

22. The Taliban government system remained nonetheless as poorly integrated as it had been under the previous Rabbani government, and provinces tended to ignore the central ministries.²⁸

23. The Taliban re-established a kind of functioning state, relying on the limited human resources available. Religious law and madrasa-trained religious judges provided a judiciary; state administration was cut to a minimum both in Kabul and in the provinces; no state budget existed; the educational system was cut down to religious madrasas and a limited number of state schools, very few of which admitted girls.²⁹ Even in the banks the

²⁶ G. Dorronsoro, *Afghanistan; revolution unending*, Hurst, 2005, 283.

²⁷ Interviews with tribal notables and former Taliban officials, 2005-7.

²⁸ Zaef, 93.

²⁹ Interviews with tribal notables and former Taliban officials 2005-7.

Taliban left most of the employees in place, except for women, and appointed Taliban cadre as directors.³⁰

Policing

24. The Taliban Emirate's police were little more than a branch of the army and had a very low grade of specialisation; training had almost been completely abandoned and purge after purge few professional officers were left in the system. Some professional police stayed in the job, at least for some time. They were then often accused of being infidels and communists and sometimes purged or arrested; mostly they quit the job because of the humiliations they were going through.³¹ The only professional police officers, who had received official training under Najib's rule and were not dismissed by the Taliban, were working at the Passport Department and ID Issuance Department. The few police officials who were allowed to wear uniforms were the traffic police officers who were stationed on the streets to manage the flow of traffic. In sum, the little that has remained of a professional police force was lost under the Taliban's rule.³² Even in the later years of the Taliban regime they could at least be found among the traffic police; in one incident, a German NGO employee was rescued from an aggressive Talib policeman by some old professionals.³³

25. The Taliban regime made its own effort to re-launch the Police Academy and in 1997 courses for police officers with 100-120 students took off. The curriculum was modified with the injection of high doses of shari'ah and several mullahs were integrated in what was left of the teacher corps. None of the students managed to graduate before the collapse of the Taliban regime, but they joined the police force of Karzai's interim government.³⁴

³⁰ Zaeef, 81-3.

³¹ Interview with Dagarwal Sher Ali Khan, Kandahar 31 Jan 06, police force, 17 years in kandahar Originally from east Afghanistan

³² Interviews with police officers who worked at the Provincial Police Headquarter, Heart, July 2009; Interview with mhd. Nekzad, 28 May 2006, Kabul, head of crime and investigation unit of Mol

³³ Interview with Peter Schwittek Kabul 23 oct 2007

³⁴ Interview with Ustad Zal, Police Academy, Kabul, April 2008.

26. By and large the police as an institution collapsed as the Taliban dismissed the bulk of the police force and placed their fighters in police stations.³⁵ The Taliban regime ignored the criminal procedure code and eliminated the function of public prosecution (attorney general); to a great degree it also ignored many provisions of the penal code.³⁶ The police stations, now manned by young fighters without any uniform and mainly from Pashtun regions, operated almost autonomously. The Taliban fighters occupying the police stations would not open a file or record the petitions or the cases. They would not refer the criminal cases to the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Provincial Police Directorate or even report to it. The Taliban abandoned the bureaucratic rules and procedures of the police completely.

27. In its own way the Taliban policing system was more functional than the previous Rabbani regime's one. They had no pretence of sticking to the system developed until the 1980s and replaced it with one of their own conception: very basic but functional in its own terms. Everybody in Afghanistan, even the most bitter adversaries of the Taliban, seems to agree that they were successful in maintaining security in the areas under their control; crime almost disappeared. Although the international press in those days focused on the draconian punishment inflicted by Taliban courts, the real strength of the system was the ability of the system to apprehend most criminals. The Taliban relied on the cooperation of the population, on a vast network of informers and on the willingness of their 'policemen' to pursue the culprits relentlessly.

28. A new development under Taliban's rule was the establishment of a religious police. The Taliban created Ministry of Enforcing Virtue and Preventing Vice. The Ministry had directorates in every province which functioned as religious police. Their men patrolled the city quite often and forced people to close down their stores at the time of the daily prayers and attend mosques. They also punished women who attended public spaces without an accompanying male.

³⁵ Interviews with police officers who worked under Taliban's rule, Herat, July 2009.

³⁶ Michael E. Hartmann and A. Klonowiecka-Milart, Lost in translation: legal transplants without consensus-based adaptation, in Whit Mason (ed.) , The rule of law in Afghanistan, Cambridge UP 2011, pp. 266-300, p. 269

Military affairs

29. The Ministry of Defence played no operational role during the Emirate, as Mullah Omar was directly in command of the military leaders, who had direct access to him.³⁷ This was possible because in the Taliban's military system each commander carried out his own recruitment, initially largely in the madrasas and then elsewhere as well. These commanders could decide how many and which men to recruit, in accord with the zonal commanders appointed by Mullah Omar. Payments were then transferred to the commanders, who would pay the troops, but inspectors were often sent to check the troops and make sure there were no inflated claims. The Ministry of Defence commanders in each region only had the authority to plan, not to take any decision. Most decisions were taken collectively in meeting of military commanders, presided over by Mullah Omar.³⁸

30. Once in control of Kabul, the Taliban invested some energy in enlisting the remnants of the regular armed forces such as tank crews, air force pilots and mechanics, artillerymen and communication specialists, as well as in training to some extent their own core supporters in handling sophisticated military equipment. The Taliban recruited hundreds of specialists who had served under the HDKh, essentially on a mercenary basis. A source estimated that 1,600 were taken into service, although a significant number was later purged because of suspected disloyalty, once their past allegiance to the HDKh was discovered. At least some of them, however, had good relations with Mullah Omar himself.³⁹ A different source claims that there were 2,000 such specialists in the air force alone before the capture of the north, which allowed the co-opting of another 1–2,000 specialists. According to the same source, there were another 2–3,000 specialists in the army at the peak of their presence. They were mainly motivated by the small salaries that the Taliban were offering: 2.5 million Afs (\$50) for the pilots and 1.2–1.5 million afs (\$25–30) for the engineers.⁴⁰

³⁷ Interview with Mullah Rocketi, Kabul, 3 October 2006.

³⁸ Sinno, 241–2; Muzhda, 1382, Chapter 'Dar bakhsh-e nezami'.

³⁹ Sinno, 241–2; Interview with Wahid Muzhda, Kabul, 3 June 2006; Interview with Ghulam Jailani, ex air force brigadier general, Kandahar, 29 January 2006.

⁴⁰ Interview with Wahid Muzhda, Kabul, 3 June 2006; Interview with Ghulam Jailani, Kandahar, 29 January 2006.

31. The air force was totally dependent on these specialists, of course. The air force was an exception in that the old structure and chain of command was maintained; the changes introduced by the Taliban were superficial ones: long beards, praying five times a day, etc.⁴¹

32. The role of the professional officers was essentially to advise their Taliban bosses. The relationship was far from easy and even many of those who were not purged left of their own initiative.⁴²

33. In general, the Taliban did not try much to upgrade the technological level of their army; on the whole they used what they had inherited from previous governments and mostly limited themselves to purchasing spare parts. Except for the air force, the Taliban in any case needed few specialists and were not dependent on modern technologies for their fighting. Tanks, for example, were only used in defensive roles. Attacks were typically carried out with waves of pick-up trucks.⁴³ Their awareness of the limitation of the resources available might be behind the Taliban's downsizing of the administration and their desire to keep the armed forces 'simple'.

34. The Ministry of Defence controlled the 'army' and a territorial force comprised also of former enemies who had turned themselves over. Such territorial force operated mainly where the Taliban felt that their own base of support was limited, such as in the north and in Hazarajat.⁴⁴

35. Apart from the small air force, the armed forces were therefore essentially an irregular militia under the orders of charismatic warrior mullahs, with the addition of specialised artillery and armoured units, staffed by professionals left over from the Soviet period. Other specialists were embedded with infantry units to provide communication and other skilled services. Except for two mobile reserve units held in Kabul, the cleric-commanders owned

⁴¹ Interview with Wahid Muzhda, Kabul, 3 June 2006; Interview with Ghulam Jailani, Kandahar, 29 January 2006.

⁴² Interview with Ghulam Jailani, Kandahar, 29 January 2006.

⁴³ Interview with Wahid Muzhda, Kabul, 3 June 2006.

⁴⁴ Interview with Wahid Muzhda, Kabul, 3 June 2006.

their own units patrimonially, imposing their own rules of recruitment and service. Their men were their *andiwāl* (companions).⁴⁵

36. The chain of command seems to have been generally respected, at least by the standards of a 'pre-bureaucratic army'; commanders had plenty of autonomy in how to manage their own unit, but orders from above were usually respected, even if formal ranks did not really exist or were not given importance. Occasionally, however, the leadership had to negotiate with field commanders, as in the case of the taking of Mazar-i Sharif in 1998 and the desire of the local commander to indulge in revenge-taking; Mullah Omar reportedly tried to prevent that but had eventually to agree to revenge-taking.⁴⁶

37. Intelligence was gathered through the informal cooperation of supporters in the villages, mostly clerics sympathising with a like-minded regime. As a result intelligence gathering might not have been very professional, but offered a very detailed knowledge of local situations, which the Taliban exploited to their benefit.⁴⁷

38. Except for parts of north-eastern Afghanistan and a few pockets of opposition spread around the country,⁴⁸ despite their relative poverty of means and their unsophisticated structure, the Taliban proved remarkably successful in controlling the country and imposing a *Pax Talibana*.

39. In conclusion, The Taliban government did not compare poorly with its predecessor, the Rabbani government, which had relied on printing money in Russia for funding its war effort and had struggled much more to control the country. The Taliban government had a yearly budget in the range of \$80-150 million a year, which is of course very little to run a country whose population was around 25 million that that time. Although only three foreign governments recognised the Taliban government, another four or five countries considered


⁴⁵ Personal communications with former government officials and former members of the Taliban, Kabul 2006–8. See also Davis, 1988.

⁴⁶ Personal communications with former government officials and former members of the Taliban, Kabul 2006–8. See also Davis, 1988.

⁴⁷ Personal communications with former government officials, Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Jalalabad, 2005–8.

⁴⁸ See Giustozzi, 2009.

recognising it at different stages, including the US government. The way the Taliban system of government worked resembled that of the monarchy, before the liberal reforms of the 1960s, with the exception for increased women segregation.



Dr. Antonio Giustozzi

Harpenden, 31 July 2020

Annex – Expertise

1. I am a senior visiting professor at the War Studies Department (KCL). I hold a PhD in International Relations from LSE, which I received in 1997. My publications include:

[books:]

The Taliban at war, London : Hurst, 2019

The Islamic State in Khorasan, London : Hurst, 2018

[with Artemy Kalinovsky] *Missionaries of modernity: Advisory Missions and the Struggle for Hegemony, from the 1940s to Afghanistan*, London : Hurst, 2016

The Army of Afghanistan: a political history of a fragile institution, London : Hurst, 2016

Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan, London : Hurst, 2012

Empires of mud: wars and warlords in Afghanistan, London : C. Hurst & Co, 2009

Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan field, London : C. Hurst & Co and New York : Columbia University Press, 2009 (as editor and contributor)

Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the rise of the Neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, C. Hurst & Co., London and Columbia University Press, New York, 2007;

War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992, C. Hurst and Co., London, March 2000, and Georgetown University Press, April 2000;

[other publications:]

‘Can the Afghan state intervene successfully in the conflict between nomads and settlers?’, Kabul : AREU, February 2020

‘Flawed Afghanisation: Underestimating and Misunderstanding the Taliban’, in David Fitzgerald, David Ryan, and John M. Thompson (eds.), *Not even past: How the United States Ends Wars*, New York ; Berghan Books, 2020

‘Major territorial defeat severely undermines Islamic State presence in eastern Afghanistan’, *Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 12 Dec 2019

‘Nomad-settler conflict in Afghanistan today’, Kabul : AREU, October 2019

‘Rise and Decline of Al-Qaida in Syria’, Washington : CRPA, October 24, 2019

‘I Taliban e le elezioni afghane: una strategia, tre obiettivi’, in Giuliano Battiston and Nicola Missaglia, ‘Presidenziali in Afghanistan: molto più di un voto’, Milan : ISPI, 26 September 2019

‘Nomad Sedentarisation Processes in Afghanistan and Their Impact on Conflict’, Kabul : AREU, September 2019

‘TTP leadership strives to reverse trend of defections and splintering in Pakistan and Afghanistan’, *Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 4 September 2019

‘Potential open emergence of Shia militia in Afghanistan unlikely to pose high threat to NATO or US forces’, *Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 15 Aug 19

‘The Islamic State in Khorasan’, in Francesco Marone (ed.), *The Islamic State: Five Years Later*, Milan : ISPI, 28 June 2019

‘Resurgent Islamic State fighting to establish territorial control in eastern Afghanistan’, *Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 20 June 2019

‘Between pen and sword: Examining the Taliban’s ongoing strategic calculus’, *Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 27 Mar 2019

‘Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria and Afghanistan’, CRPA, December 22, 2018

‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: Five Terrorisms’, in Sergio Miracola and Antonio Talia (eds.), ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Asia: A Compass’, Milan : ISPI, 11 December 2018

[with Shoib Najafizada] ‘Assad’s Afghan Shi’a Volunteers’, Washington : CRPA, 13 November 2018

‘The Taliban and Afghanistan’s mines’, Briefing Paper, Washington : CRPA, October 2018

‘I Talebani, lo Stato Islamico e le elezioni afghane’, ISPI Commentary, 18 October 2018 (<https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/i-talebani-lo-stato-islamico-e-le-elezioni-afghane-21453>)

‘Taliban offensive rolls back Islamic State expansion in northern Afghanistan’, *Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 10 September 18

‘IS-Khorasan Towards Financial Autonomy’, Washington : CRPA, September 2018

‘Assault on Ghazni underlines Taliban’s growing urban assault capabilities’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 30 Aug 18

‘Two campaigns for the labs: heroin, Taliban and US’, Kabul/Washington : CRPA, August 2018

‘Daesh Moves House: Settling in to Life in Afghanistan’, *RUSI Newsbrief*, 18 May 2018

‘The Islamic State’s crisis: sunset of militant Islamism in Central Asia?’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 3 May 2018

[with Anna Matveeva] ‘The Central Asian militants: cannon fodder of global jihadism or revolutionary vanguard?’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, n. 3 2018

‘Farah attack marks early launch of Taliban’s 2018 campaign’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 2 March 2018

[with Silab Mangal] ‘Al-Qaeda’s growing confrontation with the Islamic State in Afghanistan’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 6 February 2018

‘Typologies of nomad-settler conflict in Afghanistan’, Kabul : AREU, 2018

[with Ali Mohammad Ali] ‘The National Unity Government and the Re-Shaping of Political Coalitions in Afghanistan’, Washington : CRPA, January 2018

‘Enemies or jihad brothers? Relations between Taliban and Islamic State’, Washington : CRPA, 2017

‘The Arab-Gulf connections of the Taliban’, in C. Jaffrelot and L. Louer (eds), *Pan-Islamic Connections*, London : Hurst, 2017

‘The transformation of the Haqqani Network’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 2 November 2017

‘The failure of the Taliban’s 2017 urban offensive’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre*, 27 October 2017

[with Reinoud Leenders] 'Outsourcing state violence: The National Defence Force, 'stateness' and regime resilience in the Syrian war', *Mediterranean Politics*, n. 4, vol. 22, 2017

'Signs of Taliban reconciliations emerge in southern Afghanistan', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 27 September 2017

'The Hizb-i Islami Deal: Dawn of Reconciliation or Sunset of NUG?', Kabul : AF-CRPA, September 5, 2017

'Afghanistan: Taliban's organization and structure', Oslo : Landinfo, August 2017

'Afghanistan: Taliban's Intelligence and the intimidation campaign', Oslo : Landinfo, August 2017

'Mapping nomad-farmer conflict in Afghanistan', Kabul : AREU, July 2017

'The Military Cohesion of the Taliban', Kabul : AF-CRPA, July 2017

[with Artemy M. Kalinovsky] 'The professional middle class in Afghanistan: from pivot of development to political marginality', in *Humanity Journal*, Volume 8 issue 2, 2017

'Uighur Islamist militancy in Syria: Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 20 June 2017

[with Ali Mohammed Ali] 'The Trump Administration and the Afghan predicament', Kabul : AF-CRPA, n.d. but May 2017

[with Silab Mangal] 'Islamic State's Wilayat Khorasan persists in Afghanistan despite major US strike', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 5 May 2017

'Shifting ground: Competition intensifies between the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda for Central Asian support', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 25 Apr 2017

‘New power struggle within Taliban underlines weak position of leader Haibatullah’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 25 Jan 2017

‘Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001’, *Afghanistan, Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28:1, 2017, 12-33

[with Silab Mangal], ‘Dissident Taliban faction establishes relations with the Islamic State's Wilayat Khorasan’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 04-Jan-2017

‘The Taliban and the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan’, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16:6, December 2016, pp. 557-573

[with Silab Mangal] ‘Back on the offensive - Wilayat Khorasan reasserts itself in Afghanistan’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 13-Dec-2016

‘The resurgence of Shia Muslim militancy in Pakistan’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 27-Oct-2016

[with Silab Mangal] ‘An assessment of the 2016 fighting season of the Taliban’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 06-Oct-2016

‘Jihadists compete along Af-Pak border’, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 27-Sep-2016

‘Islamist militancy reportedly expands into Turkmenistan’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 13-Sep-2016

‘Appointment of military commander highlights Taliban's internal power struggles’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 08-Sep-2016

[with Silab Mangal] ‘Wilayat Khorasan unleashes new wave of violence but loses leader’, *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 06-Sep-2016

‘Wilayat Khorasan commander provides insight on deployments to Syria and Iraq’, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, 16-Jun-2016

[with Silab Mangal] ‘The strategic implications of the Taliban's seeming leadership change’, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, 20-May-2016

[with Claudio Franco] ‘Revolution in the Counter-Revolution: Efforts to Centralize the Taliban’s Military Leadership’, Central Asian Affairs 3 (2016) 249-286

[with Silab Mangal], ‘The Haqqani Network and the Taliban leadership crisis’, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, 30 March 2016

[with Silab Mangal], ‘An Interview with Mullah Rasool on Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government’, RUSI Commentary, 16 March 2016

[with Ali Mohammed Ali] ‘The Afghan National Army after ISAF’, Kabul : AREU, March 2016

‘The Islamic State in Khorasan: a nuanced view’, London : RUSI, February 2016

[with Chona Echavez, Jennifer Lyn Bagaporo and Nader Nadery] ‘The Political Economy Of Education and Health Service Delivery In Afghanistan’, Kabul : AREU, January 2016

‘Women’s Rights, Taliban, and Reconciliation: An Overview’, Central Asia Policy Brief No. 30, Central Asia Program, George Washington University, December 2015

[with Ali Mohammad Ali] ‘Reaching Boiling Point: High School Activism in Afghanistan’, Kabul : AREU, October 2015

[with Emily Winterbotham], ‘The Fall of Kunduz and the Resurgent Taliban’, *RUSI Newsbrief* 26/11/2015

[with Silab Mangal], 'A gathering storm? The Islamic State campaign in eastern Afghanistan', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 13-Nov-2015

'The Taliban and the 'Pakistani reservoir': On the importance of the Afghan community in Pakistan for the Taliban's military effort', in S. Gregory (ed.), *Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan*, London : Routledge, 2015

[with Silab Mangal] 'Building momentum – the Taliban's territorial manoeuvres in Helmand', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 05-Nov-2015

[with Silab Mangal] Assessing the Taliban's capture of Kunduz and its ongoing implications
IHS Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, 15 October 2015

[with Silab Mangal] 'The Taliban in Pieces: The Internal Struggle Behind the Announcement of Mullah Omar's Death', *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, 3 August 2015

[with Ali Mohammad Ali] 'The Politicisation of Afghanistan's High Schools', Kabul : AREU, July 2015

[With Mohammed Ishaqzadeh] 'Senior Appointments and Corruption within the Afghan Mol: practices and perceptions', Kabul : Integrity Watch Afghanistan, May 2015

'The splintering Taliban: examining the proliferation of dissident factions in Afghanistan', *Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, 6 March 2015

[with Silab Mangal] 'Taking shape: The Islamic State expands into Pakistan with Tehrik-e-Khilafat', *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor*, 30 January 2015, 7 pages

'The Black Market for weapons in Afghanistan', in Small Arms Survey, 'The illicit firearms market: case studies and insights', Geneva, 2015

[with Silab Mangal] 'Iranian insurgent groups maintain Baluch threat', IHS Jane's Intelligence Review, 2 January 2015, 8 pages

[with Silab Mangal] 'Violence, the Taliban and Afghanistan's 2014 elections', Washington ; USIP, 2015

'Local and Tactical Political Accommodation: Evidence from Afghanistan', in T. Clack And R. Johnson (eds.), *Transition, Handover and Withdrawal: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Exit*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014

'Parable of a Taliban commander - The rise and fall of Mullah Zakir', *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor*, 1 December 2014, 10 pages

End game: the IMU shifts its jihadist strategy', *IHS Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 26, n. 11, November 2014

[with Adam Bacsko] 'The Politics of the Taliban's Shadow Judiciary, 2003–2013', *Central Asian Affairs*, 1 – 2014, 199-224

'The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects, Kabul : AREU, 2014

'The Taliban's military courts', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, forthcoming in issue vol. 25, n. 2, 2014.

'Afghanistan's decentralised foreign policy', *Central Asian Affairs*, 1-2014 (March)

'The Taliban and the 2014 elections in Afghanistan', Washington : USIP, 2014

[with Casey Johnson] 'Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan', Peace brief 163, Washington : USIP, 2013

[with Mohammed Ishazadeh] 'On Afghanistan's roads: extortion and abuse against drivers', Kabul : IWA, 2013

'March towards democracy? The development of political movements in Afghanistan', Central Asian Survey, September 2013

'The next Congo: Regional Competition for Influence in the Wake of NATO Withdrawal', Afghanistan Regional Forum n. 10, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, September 2013

[with Theo Farrell] 'The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012', International Affairs, July 2013

'The military adaptation of the Taliban, 2002-2011', in *Fighting the Afghanistan War: States, Organisations and Military Adaptation*, Stanford University Press, 2013

[with Claudio Franco] 'The Ongoing Battle for Education. Uprisings, Negotiations and Taleban Tactics', Berlin : AAN, 2013

'If only there were leaders: the problem of fixing the Pashtun tribes', in Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkins (eds.), *Beyond Swat*, London : Hurst, 2013

'The local politics of the Taliban', in *Beyond the state – Local politics in Afghanistan*, edited by Conrad Schetter, London : Hurst, 2013

'Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?', Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Central Asia Policy Brief n. 7, January 2013

[with Claudio Franco and Adam Bazko] 'Shadow justice: how the Taliban run their judiciary', Kabul : Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2013

‘The resilient oligopoly: a political economy of northern Afghanistan 2001 and onwards’,
Kabul : AREU, 2013

‘Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?’, Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University, Central Asia Policy Brief n. 7, January 2013

[with Ashley Jackson] ‘The other side: humanitarian engagement with the Taliban in
Afghanistan’, HPG Working Paper, London : ODI, December 2012

[with Niamatullah Ibrahim] ‘From new dawn to quicksand: The political economy of
statebuilding in Afghanistan’, in *The Political Economy of Post-conflict Statebuilding: Power
after Peace*, Edited by Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, Routledge, 2012

‘Taliban networks in Afghanistan’, Newport : CIWAG, 2012, 84 pp.

‘Justice And State-Building In Afghanistan: State Vs. Society Vs. Taliban’, Occasional paper,
Kabul : The Asia Foundation, Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People, Part 4 of 4, August
2012

‘Auxiliary irregular forces in Afghanistan: 1978-2008’, Chapter in M. Innes (ed.), *Making Sense
of Proxy Warfare: States, Surrogates, and the Use of Force*, Dulles : Potomac Books, 2012.

‘Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban’s Shadow Government’, *Prism* vol. 3 n. 2,
March 2012

‘Insurgency in Afghanistan’, in Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), *The Routledge
Companion to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency*, London : Routledge, 2012

[with Niamatullah Ibrahim] ‘Thirty years of conflict: Drivers of anti-government mobilisation
in Afghanistan, 1978-2011’, Kabul : AREU, January 2012

[with Claudio Franco] 'The battle for the schools: The Taleban and state education', Kabul/Berlin : Afghan Analyst Network, 2011

[with Mohammad Isaqzada] 'Afghanistan's para-military policing in context: The risks of expediency', Kabul/Berlin : Afghan Analyst Network, 2011

'Restructuring the defence sector', in DCAF Afghanistan Working Group, *Afghanistan's security sector governance challenges*, Geneva : DCAF, 2011

'Afghanistan: Human Rights and security situation', Oslo : Norwegian Landinfo, 2011

'Armed Politics and Political Competition in Afghanistan', in 'The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding', Ed. By Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal, London : Routledge, 2011

[with Christoph Reuter] 'The Insurgents of the Afghan North', Kabul/Berlin : Afghan Analyst Network, May 2011

Double-Edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining and State-Building, Working Paper 86 series 2, London : Crisis States Research Centre, February 2011

'Dilemmas of governance in Afghanistan: between patrimonialism and bureaucratisation', in *Understanding Afghanistan: a multi-disciplinary approach*, ed. By A. Schlenkhoff and C. Oeppen, London : C. Hurst, September 2010

The Taliban beyond the Pashtuns, The Afghanistan papers n. 5, Waterloo (Ontario) : CIGI, July 2010

Negotiating with the Taliban: issues and prospects, New York : The Century Foundation, June 2010

'Cycles of war and peace in Afghanistan: understanding the political economy of conflict', Policy Direction brief, London : Crisis States Research Centre LSE, June 2010

[with Christoph Reuter], 'The Northern Front: The Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns', Briefing Paper, Kabul : Afghan Analyst Network, June 2010

Nation-building is not for all: the politics of education in Afghanistan, Thematic report 2/2010, Berlin/Kabul : Afghan Analyst Network, May 2010

Between patronage and rebellion: Student politics in Afghanistan, briefing paper, Kabul : Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010

'Afghanistan', in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Global Survey of Islamism*, Armonk : ME Sharpe, 2010

[with Talatbek Masadykov and James Michael Page] 'Negotiating with the Taliban: toward a solution for the Afghan conflict', Working Paper 66.2, London : Crisis States Research Centre (LSE), 2010

Afghanistan: 'friction' between civilizations', Chapter 3 of *The Borders of Islam: Exploring Huntington's Faultlines, from Al-Andalus to the Virtual Ummah*, ed . by Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas, London : Hurst, 2009

'The Afghan national Army: unwarranted hope?', *RUSI Journal*, December/January 2009, pp. 34-40

'The eye of the storm: cities in Afghanistan's civil wars', London : Crisis States Research Centre (LSE), Working Paper 62.2, 2009

'Afghanistan: the patrimonial trap and the dream of institution-building', Chapter in 'Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age', ed. By D. Kostovicova and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Ashgate, 2009

‘Afghanistan: Getting Worse Before Getting Better?’, Writenet Report commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section, June 2009

‘One or many? The issue of the Taliban’s unity and disunity’, Brief N. 48, Bradford : Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), April 2009

[with D. Orsini] ‘Centre-periphery relations in Afghanistan between patrimonialism and institution-building: The Case of Badakhshan’, *Central Asian Survey*, March 2009

‘The pigmy who turned into a giant: the Afghan Taliban in 2009’, *LSE IDEAS Strategic Update* 1/2009, pp. 9-11

‘Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan’, in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform: DCAF Annual* (Geneva), 2008, pp. 215-32

Transition without end: an analytical narrative of Afghanistan, Working paper, London : Crisis States Research Centre, 2008

‘The Neo-Taliban insurgency: from village Islam to international jihad’, chapter in *Afghanistan: Transition under Threat*, by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra (eds.), Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

‘The SCO: A Regional Organisation In The Making’ (with Anna Matveeva), Working paper 39 series 2, London : Crisis States Research Centre (LSE), September 2008

‘Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization’, in *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), Volume VI, Issue 9, 1 May 2008

‘Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan’, *Conflict, Security & Development*, n. 2, 2008

“Afghanistan: Political Parties or Militia Fronts?” Chapter 8 of *Transforming rebel movements after civil wars*, ed. by J. de Zeeuw, Lynne Reinner Publishers, November 2007;

‘The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen’s competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006’, *Central Asian Survey*, June 2007;

“Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan’s ‘ANA’ and the counter-insurgency effort, 2002-2006”, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 45–67, March 2007;

“How the Taliban re-established themselves inside Afghanistan”, in A. Knyazev (ed.), *Афганистан и безопасность Центральной Азии*, 3rd issue, Moscow, 2007;

“War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.14, No.1, January 2007, pp.75–89;

“The missing ingredient: non-ideological insurgency and state collapse in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992”, Working Paper Series 2 n. 11, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2007;

“À qui est l’Afghanistan?”, Paris : *Outre-Terre*, n. 16, 2006, pp. 197-213;

“The privatizing of war and security in Afghanistan: future or dead end?”, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007), pp. 19-23;

“Processes of political ethnicisation in Afghanistan”, *Afghanistan Info*, September 2006, pp. 9-10;

‘Tribes and warlords in southern Afghanistan’, Working Paper 7 Series 2, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2006;

‘Genesis of a Prince: The rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992’, Working Paper 4 Series 2, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2006;

“Afghanistan: exploring the peacebuilding potential of the private sector”, in Jessica Banfield, Canan Gündüz and Nick Killick (eds.), *Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector*, London, International Alert, July 2006;

(with Simonetta Rossi) “Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities”, Working Paper 2 Series 2, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2006;

“The ethnicisation of an Afghan faction: Junbesh-i Milli from the origins to the Presidential elections (2004)”, Working Paper No. 67 of the Crisis States Research Centre, DESTIN, LSE, 2005;

“Afghan demobilisation masks continued militia resistance”, *RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor*, May 2005, pp. 17-19;

“Conflicting intelligence clouds assessment of Iraqi insurgency”, *RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor*, April 2005, pp. 14-16;

“Bad State vs. Good Warlords? A Critique of State-building Strategies in Afghanistan”, Working Paper No. 51 of the Crisis States Program, LSE, 2004;

“The Demodernisation of an Army: Northern Afghanistan 1992-1998”, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* vol. 15 n. 1, 2004, pp. 1-18;

(with Mark Sedra), “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, National Army, Technical Annex, World Bank/Government of Afghanistan, January 2004;

“Military reform in Afghanistan”, chapter included in M. Sedra (ed.), “Afghanistan: assessing the progress of security sector reforms”, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, 2003;

“Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan”, Working Paper No. 33 of the Crisis States Program, DESTIN, LSE, 2003.

At present I am carrying out several research projects, including one on origins, development and future prospects of the private militias in Afghanistan and one on the security agencies. I have been to Afghanistan during the following periods:

- April/May 2003 (Kabul) to carry out work on the Afghan National Army;
- October 2003-September 2004, working with UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan) as a Political Affairs Officer in Kunduz and Mazar-i Sharif;
- November/December 2004 and March 2005 to carry out a consultancy project on the provincial administrations of Kandahar, Faryab and Herat provinces;
- February 2005 to research on customs and taxation issues in Kabul;
- May 2005 to research the relationship between business and politics in Kabul, Mazar and Herat;
- September-October 2005 to research local power structures in Herat province;
- January-February 2006 to study the security situation and local strongmen in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad;
- May-June 2006 to study security and the 1980s jihad movement in Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and Kabul;
- September-October 2006 to study jihad and security issues in Kabul and Paktia;
- February-March 2007 in Kabul and Nangarhar to study the 1980s jihad;
- April-May 2007 in Kabul and Paktia to continue my study of the period of jihad;
- October 2007 in Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif, Shiberghan and Sar-i Pul to study the local political situation and some aspects of local history;
- April-May 2008 in Kabul and Herat, to study issues of local governance of as a consultant for DFID;
- October 2008 in Kabul, Khost and Mazar-i Sharif, to study local governance and the ongoing insurgency;
- March-April 2009 in Kabul, Maimana and Gardez, to study local governance and the ongoing insurgency;

- September-October 2009 in Kabul and Herat to research student politics and the role of foreign advisers;
- April 2010 in Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-i Sharif, researching the penetration of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan and advising and mentoring in Afghanistan;
- October-November 2010 in Kabul, carrying out research on Afghanistan's police;
- April 2011 in Kabul to research Taliban and education and the Afghan Ministry of Interior;
- September-October 2011 in Kabul to research corruption in the police and the organisation of the Taliban;
- March-April 2012 in Kabul and Balkh to carry out a project on humanitarian access;
- June-July 2012 in Kabul and Balkh to carry out a project on the political economy of northern Afghanistan;
- September 2012 to manage projects on Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior and on the Taliban;
- March-April 2013, to carry out research on the Afghan National Army and on the attitude of the Taliban towards the 2014 presidential elections;
- September 2013, to carry out research on the Afghan National Army and on conflict in southern Afghanistan;
- October 2013, to carry out research on the 2014 elections in Afghanistan and manage research on conflict in southern Afghanistan;
- March 2014, to finalise a project on the mapping of Taliban networks in Afghanistan;
- May 2014, to study the Taliban and their attitude towards the Afghan elections of 2014;
- September 2014, to launch a project on the history of the Taliban;
- November 2014 in order to launch a project on the politicisation of high school students and another on humanitarian access;
- March-April 2015, to manage a project on the history of the Taliban;
- May 2015, to wrap up a project on the politicisation of high school students;
- September-October 2015, to launch a project on drug smuggling;
- January 2016, to complete a project on drug smuggling for UNODC and manage a project on the Islamic State for RUSI;
- May 2016, to launch a UNDP project in support of the High Peace Council;

- June 2016, to complete the UNDP project on reconciliation;
- July 2016, to launch a World Bank project on service delivery;
- October 2016, to complete a World Bank project on service delivery;
- November 2016, to participate in an ATR study of humanitarian access;
- June 2017, to carry out a project on nomad/farmer conflict;
- September 2017, to continue work on nomad/farmer conflict;
- November 2017, to get updated on the country situation;
- January 2018, to continue the project on nomad/farmer conflict;
- May 2018, to complete the project on nomad/settler conflict;
- January 2019, to carry out an assessment of the NATO mission in the country;
- June 2019, to complete a study of future post-conflict reintegration.

I have previously given evidence in legal proceedings, including in the immigration field, in Great Britain, The Netherlands, Sweden and Australia. I am unable to provide specific names of cases because it is my understanding this would violate applicable European and other privacy laws. I have in some cases in the past declined to prepare expert reports, where, in my view, the account given jarred with my knowledge and understanding of relevant conditions in Afghanistan or historic events.